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Abstract 
Online review platforms have become very popular in recent years, generating massive numbers of 
online reviews and thus enticing numerous enterprises to respond to reviews. Although the economic 
impact (e.g., sales impact) of managerial responses is well recognized, it is unclear whether such an 
impact is moderated by competitive intensity and market position. This study examines the 
moderating effects of competitive intensity and market position in the relationship between 
managerial responses and sales. Using a panel dataset from one of the largest restaurant review 
platforms in China, this research found that the influence of the volume of managerial responses to 
positive word-of-mouth (WOM) on sales declined with increasing competitive intensity and 
decreasing market position. Moreover, we found the volume and degree of personalization of 
managerial responses to negative WOM to be more important for enterprises with a low market 
position versus those with a high market position. Our results provide insights into the effectiveness 
of managerial responses in different environments. We also offer managerial implications to service 
providers on response strategies. 
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1 Introduction 
Most online platforms, such as Amazon and Yelp, now 
provide product reviews. Visitors on Yelp, for 
example, have written more than 171 million reviews 
(yelp.com, 2018). Given the popularity of online 
review platforms, the practice of publicly responding 
to online reviews has emerged as an important 
management intervention strategy adopted by many 
businesses (Proserpio & Zervas, 2017). Because of 
their public nature, online managerial responses can 
influence customers who observe reviews and 
managerial responses to these reviews (Chen et al., 
2019; Chung et al., 2020; Gu & Ye, 2014; Huang & 
Ha, 2020).  
Such responses may induce positive effects, such as 
mitigating the adverse effects of negative word-of-
mouth (WOM) (Deng & Ravichandran, 2016; 
Gunarathne et al., 2017), addressing consumer issues 
(Lee & Song, 2010), reducing misinformation (Wang 
& Chaudhry, 2018), and establishing a positive firm 
image (Proserpio & Zervas, 2017; Xie et al., 2016; Ye 
et al., 2008). According to a study on the hotel industry 
by Nerval Corp. (Clarke, 2015), 87% of respondents 
stated that an appropriate response to a bad review 
improved their impression of the reviewed hotel and 
71% of respondents believe that managerial responses 
are important. A different survey found that over half 
of respondents were more likely to book a hotel that 
had responded to reviews (eMarketer, 2013). 




Nevertheless, the effectiveness of managerial 
responses is likely influenced by consumer trust 
(Crijns et al., 2017; Wei et al., 2013). Since managers 
may appear flippant, overzealous, or insincere in their 
responses (Wang & Chaudhry, 2018), the impact of 
managerial responses may not always be positive. 
Furthermore, consumers may consider firm-generated 
content to be less trustworthy and less credible than 
user-generated content (Goh et al., 2013; Sparks et al., 
2013). Thus, studies should focus on situations in 
which managerial responses play a positive role. 
Because enterprises do not operate in a vacuum and 
compete on digital platforms (Kumar et al., 2018), 
each enterprise faces a specific competitive 
environment and occupies a specific market position. 
In the marketing and information systems (IS) 
literature, it has been confirmed that competitive 
intensity and market position moderate the 
relationships between firm behaviors and performance 
(Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Kim & Joo, 2013; Liu & 
Yang, 2009; Melville et al., 2007). Specifically, 
competitive intensity is defined as the degree to which 
a firm faces competition in a market (Grewal & 
Tansuhaj, 2001), and market position refers to a firm’s 
position within its market, as characterized by market 
share (Hopkins, 1987). While managerial responses 
certainly represent a type of firm behavior, few studies 
have investigated whether the positive impact of 
managerial responses on sales is contingent on 
competitive intensity and market position. To fill this 
research gap, the present study focuses on the 
following research question:  
RQ: How do competitive intensity and market position 
moderate the positive effects of managerial 
responses  to online reviews on sales? 
To answer this research question, we collected data 
from ABC.com, one of the largest restaurant review 
platforms in China. 1  We consider four aspects of 
managerial response: volume of managerial responses 
to positive WOM (MR-P), degree of personalization of 
MR-P, volume of managerial responses to negative 
WOM (MR-N), and degree of personalization of MR-
N. Since the variables (competitive intensity, market 
position, managerial response variables) exist on two 
levels, we adopted multilevel models and obtained the 
following results. First, high competitive intensity or 
low market position resulted in a lower positive impact 
of MR-P volume on sales. Second, the positive effects 
of MR-N volume and degree of personalization were 
more evident in sales of enterprises with low market 
positions compared with those with high market 
positions. Third, competitive intensity did not affect 
 
1 The review platform that provided the data has requested 
anonymity. 
the influences of MR-N volume and degree of 
personalization on sales. 
This research offers several contributions. First, we 
unveil how competitive intensity and market position 
moderate the effects of managerial responses to online 
reviews (henceforth, “managerial responses”) on sales, 
extending the literature on the impact of managerial 
responses and the moderating effects of competitive 
intensity and market position. Second, using the 
persuasion knowledge model (PKM) and its related 
research as a basis, this study reveals how competitive 
intensity and market position influence consumer trust 
in managerial responses, topics that have been ignored 
by previous studies. Third, we demonstrate that market 
position influences the effects of different types of 
managerial responses through different mechanisms. 
Finally, our findings provide guidance to firms on how 
to respond to reviews according to competitive 
intensity and market position. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews the literature on managerial responses and the 
contingent roles of competitive environment and 
market position in other management contexts. Section 
3 proposes a set of hypotheses on the moderating 
effects of competitive intensity and market position. 
Section 4 describes our research methodology and 
data. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 
discusses our findings and contributions.  
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Foundation of 
Managerial Responses 
Research on managerial responses can be divided into 
two streams in terms of research methods. Scholars in 
the first stream have examined the effectiveness of 
managerial responses by focusing on different 
response strategies using experimental methods 
(Crijns et al., 2017; Dens et al., 2015; Lee & Song, 
2010; Marx & Nimmermann, 2017; Mauria & 
Minazzi, 2013; Sparks et al., 2016; van Noort & 
Willemsen, 2012; Wei et al., 2013). Several studies 
have considered two types of response strategies: 
namely, defensive and accommodative responses. For 
instance, Lee and Song (2010) incorporated the “no 
action” strategy into existing defensive-
accommodative strategies, demonstrating that 
accommodative responses lead to better company 
evaluations than defensive and “no action” strategies. 
Dens et al. (2015) investigated how service providers 
should react to different degrees of negative reviews 
with different response strategies.  
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Other studies have examined the effect of tailoring 
responses to reviews (Wei et al., 2013) and have 
investigated responses framed in past or future actions 
(Sparks et al., 2016). Studies have also related response 
strategies to platforms. For example, van Noort and 
Willemsen (2012) revealed that companies should offer 
proactive or reactive responses on brand-generated 
platforms while providing reactive responses on 
consumer-generated platforms.  
In the second stream of research, using secondary data 
from online platforms such as TripAdvisor, Ctrip, and 
Yelp, researchers have studied the impacts of various 
aspects of managerial responses, including whether to 
respond or not, volume of managerial responses, 
specific or generic responses, and responses to positive 
or negative WOM. These impacts either involve 
consumer reviewing behaviors (Chen et al., 2019; Deng 
& Ravichandran, 2016; Ma et al., 2015; Proserpio & 
Zervas, 2017; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018), or focus on 
firm performance (sales and revenue), which is relevant 
to this study (Kim et al., 2015; Kumar et al., 2018; Lee 
et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2014; Ye et al., 
2008). To illustrate, Ye et al. (2008) found that 
managerial responses greatly impact hotel bookings. 
Kim et al. (2015) suggested that a higher response rate 
to negative comments indicates better hotel 
performance. Xie et al. (2014) and Lee et al. (2017) 
explored the interaction effects between managerial 
responses and WOM, and Xie et al. (2017) 
demonstrated that performance implications of 
managerial responses depend on hotel class.  
Studies investigating managerial responses have 
explained the role of such responses from various 
theoretical perspectives. The first perspective is based on 
the service recovery literature (Dens et al., 2015; Kim et 
al., 2015; Lee & Song, 2010; Xie et al. 2014), which 
maintains that organizational responses to negative 
situations with an action plan for service recovery can 
soothe dissatisfied customers and prevent further negative 
consequences (McCollough, 2000; Swanson & Kelley, 
2001; Swanson & Hsu, 2011). However, research on 
service recovery focuses specifically on customers’ 
complaints, whereas managers respond both to negative 
and positive reviews on online platforms. Therefore, the 
service recovery literature may fail to fully explain the 
effects of managerial responses (Lee et al., 2017).  
The second perspective is based on the accessibility-
diagnosticity model (Lee et al., 2017). According to this 
model, whether consumers use any accessible 
information for decision-making depends on the 
diagnosticity of information (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). 
Specifically, a piece of information is perceived as non-
diagnostic if it has multiple interpretations (Herr et al., 
1991; Hoch & Deighton, 1989). This model has been 
adopted by certain studies to explain the effects of online 
information on firm performance (Chen et al., 2011; Lee 
et al., 2017).  
The third perspective is based on consumer trust 
(Crijns et al., 2017; Marx & Nimmermann, 2017; 
Mauria & Minazzi, 2013; Sparks et al., 2016; Wei et 
al., 2013). Consumers infer trust through their 
perceptions of firm credibility and integrity, which 
might be drawn from the source of information made 
available as a cue (Sparks et al., 2013; Sparks et al., 
2016). Information originates from two sources—
consumers and firms—and consumers exhibit different 
degrees of trust toward information from these sources. 
For instance, consumers often consider reviews by 
other consumers to be more trustworthy than 
information provided by companies, presumably 
because they perceive consumer-generated 
information to be honest and informative (Sparks et al., 
2013). Similarly, Goh et al. (2013) discovered that 
user-generated content exhibits a stronger impact than 
marketer-generated content on the purchase behavior 
of consumers. This result is partially attributed to 
consumers’ perception that marketers might 
exaggerate benefits while downplaying weaknesses to 
persuade consumers to make purchases (Goh et al., 
2013). Mauria and Minazzi (2013) identified that the 
presence of hotel managerial responses to reviews 
exerts a negative impact on purchasing intentions in 
that managerial responses might be perceived as akin 
to advertising and considered untrustworthy.  
Furthermore, the PKM posits that people actively 
develop and use persuasion knowledge to cope up with 
persuasion attempts, rather than passively receiving 
them (Friestad & Wright, 1994). Conceptually, 
persuasion knowledge refers to consumers’ theories 
about persuasion and includes beliefs about marketers’ 
motives, strategies, tactics, and ways of coping with 
persuasion attempts (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000). A 
persuasion attempt indicates a target’s (e.g., a 
consumer’s) perception of an agent’s (e.g., a firm’s) 
strategic behavior in presenting information designed 
to influence beliefs, attitudes, decisions, or actions 
(Friestad & Wright, 1994). Based on this model, Crijns 
et al. (2017) argued that managerial responses may 
activate consumers’ persuasion knowledge, allowing 
consumers to identify whether a firm is seeking to 
influence or persuade them to achieve goals, which 
may induce skepticism toward the firm and its 
responses. In summary, the effectiveness of 
managerial responses as an important form of firm-
generated content is likely influenced by consumer 
trust (Crijns et al., 2017; Wei et al., 2013). 
2.2 Moderating Effects of Competitive 
Environment and Market Position 
We consider two moderating variables: competitive 
intensity and market position. Theoretically, 
competitive intensity is an industry-level variable 
whereas market position is a firm-level variable 
(Melville et al., 2007; Hopkins, 1987).  




Previous studies have analyzed the role of competitive 
environment in moderating the impacts of firm 
behaviors such as IT investment and advertising on 
performance (Kim & Joo, 2013; Melville et al., 2007; 
Xue et al., 2012). For example, Melville et al. (2004) 
mentioned that IT is valuable but the extent of its 
value depends on external factors such as the 
competitive intensity of the environment. Melville et 
al. (2007) also explored whether the productivity 
impact of IT changes according to competitive 
environment. Based on the X-efficiency hypothesis, 
Melville et al. (2007) conjectured that the absence of 
competition leads to inefficiency in using IT. To 
verify this assumption, they used industry 
concentration as an inverse proxy for competitiveness 
and found that the marginal product of IT is low in 
concentrated (weak competitive intensity) industries. 
Kim and Joo (2013) found that the positive effects of 
advertising expenditures are stronger when product 
market competition is high, also using industry 
concentration to measure the competitiveness of 
existing markets. They argued that when the market is 
crowded with competing products, meaning that 
consumers have few opportunities to develop brand 
knowledge, advertising can be effective.  
Considerable heterogeneity also exists in the payoffs 
of marketing activities across firms with different 
market positions. For example, Chauvin and Hirschey 
(1993) compared the market value effects of 
advertising on large-, medium-, and small-sized firms. 
They observed that advertising effects are most evident 
with large firms featuring economies of scale or other 
size advantages. Liu and Yang (2009) also considered 
market positions of program-offering firms when 
examining the performance of loyalty programs. They 
found that large firms benefit more from their loyalty 
programs than small firms because high-share firms 
possess considerable customer assets and rich product 
resources.  
2.3 Limitations of Previous Research 
Prior research lags in three critical aspects that 
motivate our study. First, each enterprise is in a 
specific competitive environment and occupies a 
specific market position. Most studies implicitly 
assume that the impacts of managerial responses 
remain unchanged with competitive intensity and 
market position. However, this assumption may not 
hold in all cases. Limited studies on managerial 
responses have investigated the moderating effects of 
competitive intensity and market position. Although 
Kumar et al. (2018) considered competitive intensity, 
they mainly focused on its direct effects rather than on 
its moderating effects.  
Second, certain studies have demonstrated the 
moderating roles of competitive intensity and market 
position in the relationship between firm behaviors and 
performance, but few studies explore these moderating 
effects in the context of managerial responses. Third, 
although previous research has studied consumer trust 
in managerial responses, little research has 
investigated how competitive intensity and market 
position affect consumer trust in managerial responses.  
To fill these research gaps, this study discusses the 
impacts of managerial responses for firms with 
different market positions and in environments of 
different competitive intensity. This research 
contributes to the extant literature on the impacts of 
managerial responses. Prior research findings on the 
impacts of managerial responses are not necessarily 
consistent for firms with different market positions and 
in environments of different competitive intensity 
because competition and market position can affect the 
outcomes of firm behaviors (Liu & Yang, 2009; 
Melville et al., 2007). Examining the moderating 
effects of competitive intensity and market position 
can shed light on how the influence of managerial 
responses changes according to competitive intensity 
and market position. Our research also provides 
guidance on firm practice. When enterprises make 
strategic decisions, they often consider the market 
environment, including competitive intensity and 
market position. Understanding the moderating roles 
of these two factors can assist in determining and 
adjusting response strategies. 
3 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Focus Aspects of Managerial 
Responses 
Managerial responses can be divided into MR-P and 
MR-N. While previous research suggests that MR-P 
may convey less valuable information to future 
consumers than does MR-N (Wang & Chaudhry, 
2018), we note that firms make great efforts to respond 
to positive reviews in practice. Closer scrutiny of our 
data reveals that managers respond to positive reviews 
more often than negative reviews (both in terms of 
quantity and percentage), perhaps using their 
responses as an opportunity to express gratitude, 
highlight positive aspects of the firm, or show care 
(tripadvisor.com, 2016).  
One possible explanation for this inconsistency 
between research and practice might be that the effect 
of MR-P may vary in different scenarios, a possibility 
that previous studies have overlooked. By generating 
an understanding of whether and when MR-P are 
valuable, we can provide further guidance to firms on 
response strategies. Therefore, we consider two 
situational factors: competitive intensity and market 
position. We discuss the moderating effects of these 
two factors for both MR-P and MR-N.  
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Empirical research has devoted increasing attention to 
the volume and degree of personalization of 
managerial responses (Deng & Ravichandran, 2016; 
Lee et al., 2017; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018; Xie et al., 
2017; Xie et al., 2014). Specifically, personalization 
involves the practice of customizing MR to the 
contents of the corresponding review and targeting 
each detail regarding praise, criticism, requests, and 
suggestions from each customer (Deng & 
Ravichandran, 2016; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018). The 
volume and degree of personalization reflect the level 
of effort devoted by a firm to composing responses. 
Volume reveals the firms’ effort to respond to more 
customers, whereas degree of personalization 
demonstrates the firms’ effort to make these responses 
better by personalizing them. Thus, we focus on both 
the volume and degree of personalization of MR-P and 
MR-N in this study. Consumers may exhibit varied 
perceptions and attitudes toward different types of 
managerial responses (Deng & Ravichandran, 2016; 
Wang & Chaudhry, 2018; Wei et al., 2013), meaning 
that competitive intensity and market position may 
differently affect the performance influences of 
various types of managerial response. 
3.2 Managerial Responses and 
Competitive Intensity 
Competitive intensity may affect consumer trust in 
managerial responses; specifically, fiercer competition 
may lead to lower trust in managerial responses 
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Friestad & Wright, 1994; 
Vonk, 1998) since consumers may regard such 
responses as persuasion attempts. Furthermore, 
according to the PKM, consumers can use persuasion 
knowledge to interpret, evaluate, and cope with 
managerial responses (Crijns et al., 2017; Friestad & 
Wright, 1994). To interpret managerial responses, 
consumers first draw correspondent inferences about 
the responses (e.g., firms are sincere and will improve 
their products) and then use persuasion knowledge to 
correct the correspondent inference on the basis of an 
inference about a firm’s ulterior motives (Campbell & 
Kirmani, 2000; Vonk, 1998). If consumers are 
suspicious of a firm’s motives, they may perceive the 
firm to be “slimy,” manipulative, or insincere, 
resulting in distrust and disfavor toward the firm 
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Fein et al., 1990; Vonk, 
1998).  
The interpretation of managerial responses is affected 
by perceptions regarding firms’ dependence on 
consumers (Brown, 1990). If firms are highly 
dependent on consumers for positive outcomes, 
consumers will be more likely to attribute managerial 
responses to firms’ ulterior motives and to interpret 
managerial responses as ingratiation (Brown, 1990; 
Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Vonk, 1998). In highly 
competitive markets, consumers enjoy a dominant 
position and firms are highly dependent on consumers. 
Thus, firms are likely to be suspected of possessing 
ulterior motives and may be perceived as ingratiating 
and insincere by consumers. Consequently, consumer 
trust in firms and managerial responses is decreased, 
and the positive effects of managerial responses may 
be weakened. 
In terms of different types of managerial responses, 
more intense competition suggests a lower positive 
impact of MR-P volume on sales. Although consumers 
may draw a direct correspondent inference that 
managers are expressing gratitude in MR-P (Campbell 
& Kirmani, 2000), they may also question why firms 
are investing time in consumers who are already 
satisfied and not explicitly asking for a response 
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Crijns et al., 2017), 
leading to MR-P being perceived as disingenuous and 
manipulated (Wang & Chaudhry, 2018). For instance, 
regarding the response in Example 1 (Figure 1) some 
consumers may interpret the MR-P as appreciation, 
whereas others may suspect ulterior motives and 
interpret the response as firm promotion. If consumers 
interpret MR-P as appreciation, increasing the volume 
of MR-P can have a positive impact; however, it may 
exert minimal positive effects on purchase decisions if 
consumers suspect ulterior motives are at play. The 
likelihood of suspicion can be affected by competitive 
intensity. As discussed above, fiercer competition 
indicates more dependence of firms on consumers, 
which makes consumers be more likely to suspect 
firms of having ulterior motives (Brown, 1990; 
Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Vonk, 1998). As a result, 
consumers are inclined to distrust MR-P in a highly 
competitive environment. Thus, increasing the volume 
of MR-P may be ineffective in a highly competitive 
environment. Thus, we hypothesize that 
H1: The positive impact of MR-P volume on sales is 
lower in the presence of stronger competition. 
Review: The pearl milk tea was really delicious. It was a super super cup. Love it! 
Response: Please come back again. We will be launching a lot of new fruit drinks soon. 
Figure 1. Example 1: MR-P 
 




Review: Pretty good. I often come here to eat the working meal. 
Response: The working meal is cheap. It’s a good choice for office workers. I hope you can come to 
our restaurant often. 
Figure 2. Example 2: MR-P with a High Degree of Personalization 
More intense competition also correlates with a lower 
positive impact of highly personalized MR-P for 
similar reasons. First, while consumers may draw the 
direct correspondent inference that firms’ personalized 
responses to positive WOM express care and concern 
about what consumers say in reviews (Campbell & 
Kirmani, 2000), they may alternatively suspect ulterior 
motives because firms are investing time and effort in 
satisfied consumers not expecting a response 
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Crijns et al., 2017). 
As exemplified in Figure 2, highly personalized MR-P 
may involve highlighting the content (especially the 
positive aspects) mentioned by consumers or self-
promoting according to the consumer’s preferences 
expressed in the review. With highly personalized MR-
P, some consumers may feel that they are being heard 
by firms, whereas others may interpret the response as 
self-promotion. Highly personalized MR-P will be 
more effective if consumers feel that managers are 
showing care rather than simply promoting the firm. 
Since, as discussed above, in highly competitive 
environments, firms are more dependent on 
consumers, such consumers in highly competitive 
environments will be more likely to suspect ulterior 
motives and have lower levels of trust in MR-P of all 
types. Thus, we expect that enhancing the degree of 
MR-P personalization will have less of an impact on 
consumers’ purchase decisions in highly competitive 
environments. Hence, we hypothesize that 
H2: The positive impact of MR-P personalization on 
sales is lower in the presence of stronger 
competition. 
In comparison to MR-P volume, the effect of MR-N 
volume would be expected to be impacted less by 
competitive intensity. Compared to MR-P, MR-N may 
have a stronger positive influence on consumers’ 
purchase decisions when competition is strong. 
Previous studies have found that consumers are likely 
to voice their complaints to draw attention from 
companies, influence managers, enforce redress, and 
request a response (Chevalier et al., 2018; Ma et al., 
2015; Willemsen et al., 2013). In contrast to MR-P, 
which consumers are likely to view with suspicion in 
highly competitive environments, consumers would 
likely expect enterprises to respond to negative WOM 
to alleviate its harmful effects, especially if a reviewer 
requested a response (Chung et al., 2020; Crijns et al., 
2017; Willemsen et al., 2013). As seen in Figure 3, 
MR-N signal that firms are paying attention to 
consumer complaints. According to the service 
recovery literature, MR-N can improve consumers’ 
satisfaction and trust through articulating service 
recovery actions or plans (Dens et al., 2015; DeWitt et 
al., 2008; McColl-Kennedy & Sparks, 2003). Hence, 
compared with MR-P, we expect consumers observing 
MR-N to be less likely to suspect ulterior motives 
because MR-N may fulfill consumers’ response 
requests and are more likely to present information that 
is valuable and meaningful to consumers (Wang & 
Chaudhry, 2018). In highly competitive environments, 
we expect that increasing the volume of MR-N, which 
demonstrates the firms’ efforts to respond to as many 
consumer complaints as possible, will exert a larger 
positive effect on consumers’ purchase decisions than 
increasing the volume of MR-P. We therefore 
hypothesize that 
H3: The moderating effect of competitive intensity in 
the relationship between MR-N volume and sales 
is lower than that between MR-P volume and 
sales. 
Compared to MR-P personalization, the effect of MR-
N personalization would be expected to be less 
impacted by competitive intensity. In contexts of fierce 
competition, personalization of MR-N may exert a 
greater positive influence on consumers’ purchase 
decisions than personalization of MR-P. In contrast to 
MR-P, which consumers may regard with suspicion in 
highly competitive environments, consumers will 
likely regard firm responses to negative WOM as 
reasonable behavior because complaining consumers 
are seeking firm attention and may have even 
requested a response (Ma et al., 2015; Willemsen et al., 
2013). Enhancing the personalization of MR-N 
demonstrates the firms’ efforts to respond to consumer 
complaints as adequately as possible. As shown in 
Figure 4, an MR-N response with a high degree of 
personalization involves restating the problems, 
providing relevant explanations, or addressing specific 
issues. Personalized MR-N can provide relevant 
information describing how consumers’ concerns have 
been addressed (Xie et al., 2017).  
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Review: The meat tasted bad. 
Response: Thank you for coming to our restaurant and giving valuable feedback. We will be sure to 
carefully check the quality of our meat and work harder. Looking forward to your next visit! 
Figure 3. Example 3: MR-N 
 
Review: When I arrived at the restaurant, the waiter said that there was no kebab. Is it a kebab 
restaurant if it doesn’t sell kebab? 
Response: I'm sorry. Maybe the staff didn’t make it clear to you. We weren’t done preparing the 
kebabs when you arrived. But kebabs are available at other times. 
Figure 4. Example 4: MR-N with a High Degree of Personalization 
Hence, although intense competition may reduce 
consumer trust in managerial responses in general 
(Brown, 1990; Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Friestad & 
Wright, 1994; Vonk, 1998), consumers are less likely 
to suspect ulterior motives in the context of 
personalized MR-N versus personalized MR-P 
because personalized MR-N can satisfy consumers’ 
demand for a firm response and may convey valuable 
information to consumers (Crijns et al., 2017; Xie et 
al., 2017). Therefore, we expect the effect of MR-N 
personalization on consumers’ purchase decisions to 
be less influenced by competitive intensity than MR-P 
personalization, and hypothesize that 
H4: The moderating effect of competitive intensity in 
the relationship between MR-N personalization 
and sales is lower than that between MR-P 
personalization and sales. 
3.3 Managerial Responses and Market 
Position 
Two different viewpoints are considered for the 
influence of market position on the effectiveness of 
managerial responses. First, market position may 
affect consumer trust in managerial responses. As 
discussed above, when firms are more dependent on 
consumers to achieve positive outcomes, consumers 
are more likely to attribute managerial responses to 
ulterior motives and interpret managerial responses as 
ingratiation (Brown, 1990; Campbell & Kirmani, 
2000; Vonk, 1998). For enterprises with a low market 
position, they are highly dependent on consumers; and 
consumers are more likely to suspect their managerial 
responses to be ingratiating and insincere. Thus, 
consumer trust in such enterprises and their responses 
may decrease, and the positive effects of managerial 
responses may diminish.  
Second, market position may influence information 
diagnosticity. The accessibility-diagnosticity model 
states that consumers use a piece of information as 
input for judgments and decisions when they perceive 
such information to be diagnostic (Feldman & Lynch, 
1988). Specifically, a piece of information is perceived 
as diagnostic if it has a single interpretation and helps 
consumers assign a product to a unique category (Herr 
et al., 1991; Hoch & Deighton, 1989). Accordingly, a 
high market position is more diagnostic than a low 
market position. To illustrate, a low market position 
can be caused by either low product quality or narrow 
product positioning; by contrast, a high market 
position can be achieved only if the product is of high 
quality and matches most of consumers’ preferences 
(Chen et al., 2011). Therefore, a single interpretation 
explains the high market position, and a high market 
position is relatively diagnostic. When consumers 
possess adequate diagnostic information (i.e., high 
market position), managerial responses may not be 
needed. That is, for enterprises with a high market 
position, managerial responses likely have minimal 
impact on consumers’ purchase decisions. Conversely, 
for enterprises with a low market position, consumers 
demand additional information, such as managerial 
responses, to make purchase decisions, given the non-
diagnosticity of the low market position. 
In terms of the different types of managerial response, 
a lower market position likely correlates with little 
positive influence of MR-P volume on sales. From the 
perspective of consumer trust, although consumers 
reading MR-P may draw a direct inference that 
managers are expressing gratitude, they may also 
suspect ulterior motives, given that firms are investing 
time in satisfied consumers not seeking a response 
(Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Crijns et al., 2017), in 
which case, MR-P may be interpreted as a 




disingenuous and manipulated promotional activity 
(Wang & Chaudhry, 2018). The likelihood of 
suspicion may be affected by market position. 
Enterprises with a lower market position are more 
dependent on consumers and are thus more likely to be 
suspected of having ulterior motives when consumers 
read MR-P, resulting in distrust in the MR-P (Brown, 
1990; Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Friestad & Wright, 
1994; Vonk, 1998). Therefore, increasing MR-P 
volume may be of little value for firms with a low 
market position.  
From the perspective of information diagnosticity, 
although consumers require further information to 
make purchase decisions for enterprises with a low 
market position, MR-P may not serve as a reliable 
basis for their decisions because such responses may 
not be trusted by consumers in contexts of low market 
position (Brown, 1990; Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; 
Vonk, 1998; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018). In sum, we 
expect that the moderating effect of market position on 
the influence of MR-P is mainly based on affecting 
consumer trust rather than influencing information 
diagnosticity. Hence, we anticipate that the positive 
effect of MR-P volume on consumers’ purchase 
decisions diminishes as market position decreases, and 
hypothesize that 
H5: The positive influence of MR-P volume on sales 
is weaker when market position is lower. 
A lower market position likely also correlates with 
little positive influence of MR-P personalization on 
sales. From the perspective of consumer trust, while 
consumers observing firms responding in a 
personalized manner to positive WOM may draw the 
direct inference that managers are showing care about 
what consumers say in the review, they may also 
suspect ulterior motives because firms are devoting 
effort to consumers who are satisfied and not 
requesting a response (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; 
Crijns et al., 2017). Market position may influence the 
likelihood of suspicion. Consumers tend to suspect that 
enterprises with a low market position have ulterior 
motives for their managerial responses (Brown, 1990; 
Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Friestad & Wright, 1994; 
Vonk, 1998). That is, personalized MR-P may activate 
consumer skepticism when market position is low. 
Therefore, enhancing the personalization of MR-P will 
likely be ineffective for firms with a low market 
position.  
From the perspective of information diagnosticity, 
consumers demand more information to make 
purchase decisions for enterprises with a lower market 
position (Chen et al., 2011; Feldman & Lynch, 1988; 
Lee et al., 2017). However, enhancing the 
personalization of MR-P is unlikely to facilitate 
decision-making in this context because personalized 
MR-P may be distrusted by consumers when market 
position is low (Brown, 1990; Campbell & Kirmani, 
2000; Crijns et al., 2017; Vonk, 1998). In sum, we 
expect that the moderating effect of market position on 
the influence of MR-P personalization is mainly based 
on impacting consumer trust rather than influencing 
information diagnosticity. Hence, we anticipate that 
the positive effect of MR-P personalization on 
consumers’ purchase decisions decreases as market 
position declines, and hypothesize that: 
H6: The positive influence of MR-P personalization 
on sales is weaker when market the position is 
lower. 
Compared to MR-P volume, a lower firm market 
position is likely associated with a more significantly 
positive influence of MR-N volume on sales. From the 
perspective of consumer trust, as discussed above, 
consumers are more trusting of MR-N than MR-P 
because MR-N can fulfill consumers’ needs for 
responses and may provide meaningful information for 
consumers. Since market position has a weak influence 
on consumer trust of MR-N, MR-N should remain 
effective for enterprises with a low market position. 
From the perspective of information diagnosticity, 
because of the non-diagnosticity of the low market 
position, more information is necessary for making 
purchase decisions regarding enterprises with a low 
market position (Chen et al., 2011; Feldman & Lynch, 
1988; Lee et al., 2017). Increasing the volume of MR-
N can give consumers more information about such 
firms and facilitate their decision-making. By contrast, 
a high market position is relatively diagnostic and can 
be regarded as input for judgments and decisions. 
Thus, other information, such as MR-N, may exert 
minimal influence on consumers’ decisions regarding 
firms with a high market position if they consider high 
market position sufficiently diagnostic for decision-
making. In sum, we expect the moderating effect of 
market position on the influence of MR-N volume to 
be mainly enacted through affecting information 
diagnosticity rather than influencing consumer trust. 
Hence, we anticipate that the effect of MR-N volume 
on consumers’ purchase decisions is greater for 
enterprises with lower market position, and 
hypothesize that: 
H7: The positive influence of MR-N volume on sales 
is stronger when market position is lower. 
Similar to MR-N volume, a lower firm market position 
would be expected to correlate with a greater positive 
influence of MR-N personalization on sales. From the 
perspective of consumer trust, as discussed above, 
consumers are more trusting of personalized MR-N 
than personalized MR-P. Since the market position 
exerts a weak influence on consumer trust in 
personalized MR-N, enhancing the personalization of 
MR-N is likely to be effective for enterprises with a 
low market position. From the perspective of 
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information diagnosticity, because of the non-
diagnosticity of the low market position, consumers 
need more information to make purchase decisions for 
enterprises with a low market position (Chen et al., 
2011; Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Lee et al., 2017). 
Increasing the degree of personalization of MR-N can 
offer more relevant and specific information to 
consumers and facilitate their decision-making (Xie et 
al., 2017). By contrast, enhancing the personalization 
of MR-N may exhibit minimal influence on 
consumers’ decisions regarding enterprises with high 
market positions when a high market position is 
diagnostic enough for consumers to make decisions. 
Therefore, we expect the moderating effect of market 
position on the influence of MR-N personalization to 
be mainly affected through impacting information 
diagnosticity rather than influencing consumer trust. 
Hence, the effect of MR-N personalization on 
consumers’ purchase decisions is larger for enterprises 
with lower market positions. We thus hypothesize that 
H8: The positive influence of MR-N personalization 
on sales is stronger when market position is 
lower. 
4 Research Methodology 
4.1 Research Context 
We selected the module of restaurant services in 
ABC.com as the research context because users are 
active in this module, generating a large number of 
reviews and corresponding managerial responses. 
Furthermore, the restaurant service module requires 
high levels of involvement; consumers often spend a 
considerable amount of time searching for information 
about restaurants, including managerial responses, 
before making decisions (Gu et al., 2012; Lu et al., 
2013). Several consumers in our dataset mentioned in 
their reviews that they browsed managerial responses 
online before purchasing. For example, one consumer 
commented: “I thought the restaurant might be good 
before I went to it, because I noticed that it always 
responds to consumer reviews diligently.” 
We identify the industry encountered by each 
enterprise because we use industry concentration to 
measure the competitive intensity of existing 
industries. Bain (1951) defined industry as a group of 
outputs which to all (or most) buyers of each are 
generally close substitutes for each other and distant 
substitutes for all other outputs. He also argues that 
geographical segmentation should be considered when 
measuring substitutability. For geographically 
constrained products, such as restaurant services, the 
same kind of products in different regions are less 
substitutable because consumers must consider 
transport costs. The classification of industries 
developed in The Structure of the American Economy 
(Means, 1939) also considers geographical 
segmentation, which segregates industries into those 
having “national,” “regional,” and “local” markets. In 
our research context, restaurants can only serve local 
consumers and restaurant services in different business 
districts show poor substitutability. Therefore, we 
operationalized industry as the business district where 
the restaurant was located. In general, competitive 
environment varies from one business district to 
another. Moreover, in practice, restaurants in the same 
business district are listed together on ABC.com. 
The daily panel data originated from restaurants in the 
two largest administrative districts in Beijing. The data 
include sales, reviews, and managerial responses of 
these restaurants. A few restaurants set very low prices 
and did not sell actual products during the trial 
operation stage. Thus, we deleted their observations 
during the trial operation stage as well as those with 
missing values. The total dataset included 515,183 
observations involving 8,098 restaurants, covering 78 
business districts from April 2016 to June 2016.  
4.2 Empirical Model Specification 
Figure 5 depicts the research model. The variables 
related to the business district (competitive intensity) 
were categorized as Level 2 variables; those related to 
restaurants—i.e., variables regarding managerial 
responses, market position, and sales—were 
categorized as Level 1 variables. As restaurants located 
in the same business district may present unobservable 
characteristics in common, the error terms could 
correlate with each other if error terms are only 
considered at the restaurant level (Luke, 2004). Thus, 
we used multilevel models, also known as mixed-
effect models, to avoid this issue (de Leeuw et al., 
2008; Luke, 2004). In multilevel models, Level 2 
variables may affect those at Level 1 as well as the 
relationships among them.  
On the basis of the research model, we set up the 
following econometric models. First, we started with 
the models at Levels 1 and 2. 
Restaurant level (Level 1): 
 ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡)  =  𝛼0𝑖  + 𝛼1𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 
𝛼2𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛼3𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 
𝛼4𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 
 𝛼6𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗
 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 
 𝛼8𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛼9𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗
 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 
 𝛼10𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛼11𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛼12𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
+ 𝛼13𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝛼14𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡  +  
𝛼15𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼16𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 
 𝛼17𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝛼18𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 
𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
( 1 ) 
 






Figure 5. Research Model 
Business district level (Level 2): 
(𝛼0𝑖 - 𝛼4𝑖 vary with business districts and are affected 
by competitive intensity)  
 𝛼0𝑖 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇0𝑖  ( 2 ) 
 𝛼1𝑖  = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑖  ( 3 ) 
 𝛼2𝑖 = 𝛾20 + 𝛾21𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑖 ( 4 ) 
 𝛼3𝑖 = 𝛾30 + 𝛾31𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑖 ( 5 ) 
 𝛼4𝑖 = 𝛾40 + 𝛾41𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇4𝑖 ( 6 ) 
Then, we substituted the Level 2 equations into 
Equation (1). For simplicity, we unified coefficient 
symbols by using symbol β . Finally, we reached 
Equation (7) after rearranging. 
 ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡)  =   𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 
𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 
𝛽6𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  
 𝛽7𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
+  𝛽8𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  
𝛽9𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  𝛽10𝐶𝑟4𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗
 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 
 𝛽11𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛽12𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗
 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  
 𝛽13𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 
 𝛽14𝑀𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛽15𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 
+ 𝛽16𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛽17𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝛽18𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 
+ 𝛽19𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽20𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 
𝛽21𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽22𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 
( 7 ) 
𝛽23𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  +  𝜇1𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 
𝜇2𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 𝜇3𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1  + 
𝜇4𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑁𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇0𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Let i denote each business district, ij denote restaurant 
j in business district i, and t denote each time period 
(daily). 
Table 1 presents the description and operationalization 
of the key variables. The dependent variable was the 
daily online sales of the restaurant. The sales were log-
transformed according to prior literature (Chevalier & 
Mayzlin, 2006; Lu et al., 2013).  
RepPVol, RepNVol, RepPPer, and RepNPer are 
variables related to managerial responses. RepPVol 
and RepNVol denote the volumes of MR-P and MR-N, 
respectively. On ABC.com, consumers rate the 
restaurant on a 1-5 rating scale of poor, ordinary, good, 
excellent, and outstanding. Thus, reviews with a rating 
of less than three stars were identified as negative 
WOM and reviews with a rating of three or more stars 
were considered positive WOM. RepPPer and 
RepNPer are the average degree of personalization of 
MR-P and MR-N for each firm, with a higher average 
degree of personalization indicating more personalized 
responses. We employed the textual analysis methods 
introduced by Wang and Chaudhry (2018) and Deng 
and Ravichandran (2016) to calculate the degree of 





 MR-P Volume 
 MR-P degree of personalization 
 MR-N Volume  




WOM variables, price, number of 
branches, 
popularity, tenure, operating hours, 
time dummy variables 
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Table 1. Variable Description and Operationalization 
Variable Description Operationalization 
Sales Sales of restaurants Daily online sales of restaurants 
RepPVol Volume of MR-P 
Number of managerial responses to reviews with a rating not 
less than three stars 
RepNVol Volume of MR-N 
Number of managerial responses to reviews with a rating less 
than three stars 
RepPPer 
Average degree of personalization of 
MR-P of each firm 
We used topic probabilities to calculate a cosine similarity 
score between each pair of positive review and corresponding 
response. Then, we took the average. 
RepNPer 
Average degree of personalization of 
MR-N of each firm 
We used topic probabilities to calculate a cosine similarity 
score between each pair of negative review and 
corresponding response. Then, we took the average. 
Cr4 Four-firm concentration ratio 
Total sales of the four largest firms/total sales in served 
business districts 
Mr Market share Sales of restaurants/total sales in served business districts 
First, we applied latent Dirichlet allocation to obtain a 
mixture of topic distributions and assigned topic 
probabilities to each review and response. Then, we 
used these probabilities to calculate a cosine similarity 
score between each pair of review and response as 
specified in Equation (8), where rev and res were the 
topic probability vectors of each review and its 
corresponding response, respectively (Wang & 
Chaudhry, 2018). The cosine similarity score served as 
proxy for the degree of personalization of each 
managerial response. A higher degree of similarity 
indicates a stronger degree of personalization. Finally, 
we averaged the degree of personalization of MR-P and 














 ( 8 ) 
Cr4 denotes a four-firm concentration ratio indicating 
the degree to which the four largest firms dominate the 
market. The four-firm concentration ratio is commonly 
used as a measurement for industry concentration, 
which is an inverse proxy for the competitive intensity 
of an industry (Kim & Joo, 2013; Melville et al., 2007). 
Mr denotes market share, reflecting the market position 
of firms (Liu & Yang, 2009). As we only considered the 
restaurant industry, we adopted the absolute market 
share (the ratio of a firm’s sales to total sales in the 
served market) (Szymanski et al., 1993). 
We considered RepPVol, RepNVol, RepPPer, RepNPer, 
Cr4, and Mr in the previous time period (t-1) to avoid 
simultaneity issues (Goh et al., 2013). Moreover, we 
mean-centered these variables to alleviate 
multicollinearity concerns. Several control variables 
were included in the model. Val, Vol, and Var represent 
the valence, volume, and variance of WOM, 
respectively. Previous research has verified the impact 
of WOM on sales (Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Liu, 
2006). Price indicates average price per person (Lu et 
al., 2013). To address concerns regarding the potential 
endogeneity of price, we constructed the instrumental 
variable introduced by Lu et al. (2013). In our model, 
price was calculated based on the self-reported price by 
consumers, which reflected their consumption level. Lu 
et al. (2013) argues that if consumers have a budget, 
their historical eat-out consumption level will impact 
how much they pay when eating out. However, a 
consumer’s overall eat-out budget is not likely to 
directly impact any particular restaurant’s sales because 
the budget will be spread among many different 
restaurants (Lu et al., 2013). Therefore, the average 
historical eat-out consumption of all reviewers of the 
focus restaurant before the period under study is an 
appropriate instrumental variable for price. 
Shopnum denotes the number of branches. Owning a 
high number of branches means that a business has 
accumulated a certain reputation and is large. Popularity 
is the popularity score of the restaurant. Tenure denotes 
the number of months since the restaurant’s 
establishment. Openhour denotes the operating hours of 
the restaurant. Time dummy represents a set of time-
dummy variables at the daily level. In addition, μ0𝑖 - μ4𝑖 
captures the unobserved business district-specific effect. 
μ𝑖𝑗  captures the unobserved restaurant-specific effect. 
5 Data Analysis and Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the key 
variables. On average, MR-P outnumbered MR-N on 
ABC.com. In addition, the average degree of 
personalization of MR-P and MR-N was relatively 
low. Cr4 and Mr had wide ranges, showing the varying 
competitive intensities of different business districts 
and distinct market positions of enterprises. 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Sales (RMB) 1783.56 3145.95 5 92879 
RepPVol 16.175 80.338 0 2526 
RepNVol 1.059 3.41 0 74 
RepPPer 0.146 0.262 0 0.95 
RepNPer 0.183 0.26 0 0.907 
Cr4 0.22 0.124 0.06 1 
Mr 0.01 0.028 1.066e-08 1 
Table 3. Moderating Effects of Competitive Intensity and Market Position 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
RepPVol 0.055*** 0.100*** 
 (0.012) (0.019) 
RepNVol 0.056** 0.069** 
 (0.026) (0.028) 
RepPPer -0.028 -0.013 
 (0.021) (0.047) 
RepNPer 0.058*** 0.095*** 
 (0.018) (0.034) 
Cr4 -0.460*** -0.448*** 
 (0.147) (0.069) 
Mr 9.542** 10.420** 
 (4.122) (4.180) 
Cr4 * RepPVol  0.075** 
  (0.030) 
Cr4 * RepNVol  -0.001 
  (0.057) 
Cr4 * RepPPer  -0.059 
  (0.090) 
Cr4 * RepNPer  0.057 
  (0.135) 
Mr * RepPVol  0.197* 
  (0.106) 
Mr * RepNVol  -0.755* 
  (0.414) 
Mr * RepPPer  0.326 
  (0.405) 
Mr * RepNPer  -1.846** 
  (0.869) 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Control variables are not shown in the table. 
5.2 Results 
The coefficients were estimated using the maximum 
likelihood (ML) method (de Leeuw et al., 2008; Luke, 
2004). Table 3 presents the estimation results, which 
were run using Stata 14. Model 1 reports the direct 
effects of MR-P volume, MR-P degree of 
personalization, MR-N volume, and MR-N degree of 
personalization. Model 2 shows the moderating effects 
of competitive intensity and market position. 
The results support H1 and H5. The influence of MR-P 
volume on sales declined with increasing competition 
and decreasing market position (?̂?7 = 0.075, p < 0.05; 
?̂?11 = 0.197, p < 0.1). Since intense competition and low 
market position cause consumers to suspect ulterior 
motives when they observe MR-P (Brown, 1990; 
Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; Vonk, 1998), consumers 
may interpret MR-P as promotional activities and 
ingratiation when competition is fierce and market 
position is low (Brown, 1990; Wang & Chaudhry, 
2018). MR-P do not serve as the basis for consumer 
decisions if they are distrusted by consumers. Therefore, 
the positive effect of MR-P volume decreases in the 
presence of stronger competition and lower market 
position. 
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H2 and H6 are unsupported. MR-P degree of 
personalization showed no effect on sales (?̂?3 = -0.013, 
p > 0.1; ?̂?9 = -0.059, p > 0.1; ?̂?13 = 0.326, p > 0.1). The 
reason for this finding may be that personalized MR-P 
can activate consumer suspicion regardless of 
competitive intensity and market position. Thus, our 
findings indicate that improving the degree of 
personalization of MR-P is ineffective. 
Regarding H3, although the difference between the 
coefficients for Cr4 * RepPVol and Cr4 * RepNVol was 
insignificant (z = 0.96, p > 0.1),2 competitive intensity 
was observed to have a significant interaction effect 
with MR-P volume ( ?̂?7 = 0.075, p < 0.05) and an 
insignificant interaction effect with MR-N volume (?̂?8 
= -0.001, p > 0.1). Increasing MR-N volume indicates 
firms’ efforts to ensure that more consumers receive 
responses. Investing effort in MR-N is a reasonable 
behavior because consumers are generally seeking to 
elicit a response when they leave a complaint (Ma et al., 
2015; Willemsen et al., 2013). Thus, consumers would 
be less likely to suspect ulterior motives when observing 
MR-N because MR-N can fulfill consumers’ needs for 
responses and may provide meaningful information for 
consumers (Wang & Chaudhry, 2018). Therefore, as our 
findings indicate, the influence of competitive intensity 
on consumer trust in MR-N is weak, and MR-N volume 
maintains a relatively large impact on consumers’ 
purchase decisions regardless of competitive intensity.  
MR-P and MR-N degrees of personalization were found 
to have insignificant interaction effects with competitive 
intensity (?̂?9 = -0.059, p > 0.1; ?̂?10 = 0.057, p > 0.1). The 
difference between the coefficients for Cr4 * RepPPer 
and Cr4 * RepNPer was insignificant (z = -0.52, p > 
0.1). Thus, H4 cannot be verified. The insignificant 
interaction effect between MR-P degree of 
personalization and competitive intensity can be 
explained by the lack of MR-P personalization’s effect 
on sales. However, in contrast to MR-P personalization, 
MR-N personalization exerted a significant effect on 
sales and the insignificant interaction effect between 
MR-N personalization and competitive intensity implies 
that MR-N personalization remains effective regardless 
of competitive intensity. Since, as discussed above, 
consumers are less likely to suspect ulterior motives of 
firms writing MR-N, the effect of competitive intensity 
on consumer trust in personalized MR-N is minimal. 
Our results also support H7 and H8 (?̂?12 = -0.755, p < 
0.1; ?̂?14 = -1.846, p < 0.05). A lower firm market 
position signified a stronger positive influence of MR-N 
volume and degree of personalization on sales. Market 
 
2 We performed the statistical test of the difference between 
two coefficients by running the command lincomest in Stata, 
which calculates confidence intervals and p-values for linear 
combinations of coefficients (Newson, 2016). In this context, 
position exerts a weak influence on consumer trust in 
MR-N because such responses meet consumers’ 
response demands and are considered valuable by 
consumers (Crijns et al., 2017; Wang & Chaudhry, 
2018). Moreover, increasing the volume and degree of 
personalization of MR-N can enable consumers to 
obtain more useful and relevant information and 
facilitate their decision-making. Given the non-
diagnosticity of low market positions, consumers 
demand more information to make purchase decisions 
regarding enterprises with low market positions. Hence, 
the effects of MR-N volume and degree of 
personalization on consumers’ purchase decisions are 
more evident for enterprises with lower market position. 
Figure 6 illustrates the impacts of MR-P volume, MR-N 
volume, and MR-N degree of personalization on sales at 
different levels of competitive intensity and market 
position (there are two standard deviations between high 
and low levels). When competition is weaker or market 
position is higher, an increase in MR-P volume is 
associated with a greater increase in sales. At lower 
levels of market position, the influences of MR-N 
volume and MR-N degree of personalization are more 
significant. 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
We performed a number of robustness checks. First, 
concerns may arise about the potential relation between 
competitive intensity and market position. When there 
is stronger competition, a firm is likely to have a lower 
market share and position. To address this issue, we 
examined the moderating effect of market position in 
weakly competitive environments (i.e., above the mean 
value of Cr4) in which firms have respectively high and 
low market positions, meaning that competitive 
intensity and market position have a weak relationship. 
Similarly, we examined the moderating role of 
competitive intensity for firms with a low market 
position (i.e., below the mean value of Mr) because they 
may face either strong or weak competition. As shown 
in Models 3 and 4 in Table 4, the moderating effects of 
market position and competitive intensity remained 
consistent. 
Second, restaurants in the same business district but 
serving different cuisine types may not be close 
competitors. Thus, restaurants were identified as direct 
competitors when they were located in the same 
business district and served the same cuisine type. The 
results presented in Model 5 are qualitatively similar to 
those shown in Model 2. 
the linear combination of coefficients was the coefficient for 
Cr4 * RepPVol – the coefficient for Cr4 * RepNVol. If 0 does 
not fall in the 95% confidence interval, the difference 
between the coefficients is significant. 






Figure 6. Interaction Effect Plot 
Table 4: Robustness Checks 
Variable Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
RepPVol 0.064*** 0.129*** 0.064 0.104* 0.041 0.100*** -0.002 0.098*** 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.056) (0.055) (0.040) (0.019) (0.024) (0.020) 
RepNVol 0.016 0.048** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.056* 0.067** -0.017 0.069** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) (0.034) (0.029) (0.036) (0.028) 
RepPPer 0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013 -0.020 -0.012 
 (0.005) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.052) (0.046) (0.013) (0.047) 
RepNPer 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.093** 0.089** 0.062*** 0.094*** 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.032) (0.026) (0.037) (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) 
Cr4 -0.470*** -0.392*** -1.129*** -0.453*** -0.443*** -0.465*** -0.405*** -0.448*** 
 (0.059) (0.138) (0.076) (0.156) (0.068) (0.070) (0.059) (0.069) 
Mr 7.483*** 11.162** 10.446** 0.026** 10.415** 10.332** 10.427** 10.420** 
(SalesRank in Model 6) (0.906) (4.363) (4.476) (0.012) (4.178) (4.154) (4.218) (4.180) 
Cr4 * RepPVol  0.093** 0.154*** 0.074* 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.084*** 0.076** 
  (0.043) (0.054) (0.043) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Cr4 * RepNVol  -0.074 0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.026 -0.003 
  (0.084) (0.116) (0.037) (0.058) (0.057) (0.062) (0.055) 
Cr4 * RepPPer  -0.037 -0.052 -0.057 -0.062 -0.055 -0.041 -0.059 
  (0.155) (0.061) (0.112) (0.095) (0.087) (0.050) (0.091) 
Cr4 * RepNPer  -0.003 0.038 0.048 0.066 0.060 0.058 0.056 
  (0.157) (0.066) (0.148) (0.139) (0.138) (0.074) (0.135) 
Mr * RepPVol 0.151***  0.219** 0.0004** 0.199* 0.204* 0.293*** 0.193* 
(SalesRank in Model 6) (0.028)  (0.104) (0.0002) (0.108) (0.107) (0.076) (0.105) 
Mr * RepNVol -0.571***  -0.756** -0.002** -0.772* -0.759* -0.755* -0.753* 
(SalesRank in Model 6) (0.110)  (0.347) (0.001) (0.417) (0.418) (0.434) (0.412) 
Mr * RepPPer 0.206  0.328 0.001 0.425 0.332 0.232 0.328 
(SalesRank in Model 6) (0.193)  (0.327) (0.001) (0.431) (0.404) (0.158) (0.404) 
Mr * RepNPer -1.035***  -1.912** -0.005** -1.907** -1.814** -1.293** -1.849** 
(SalesRank in Model 6) (0.183)  (0.890) (0.002) (0.889) (0.856) (0.583) (0.868) 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Control variables are not shown in the table. 
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Third, although ABC.com provides much information 
about the market position of restaurants, such as sales 
statistics, as well as various restaurant ranking lists 
calculated based on sales, consumers may not be aware 
of the exact market share of each restaurant. To check 
the robustness of our results, we further measured 
market position using sales rank (SalesRank in Table 
4). The results reported in Model 6 are consistent with 
those shown in Model 2. 
Fourth, we assumed an independent covariance 
structure that allows for a distinct variance for each 
random effect within a random-effects equation with 
all covariances set to zero. However, this condition 
may be difficult to satisfy in practice. Hence, we 
relaxed this assumption and adopted an unstructured 
covariance structure (Luke, 2004). Model 3 presents 
the results. No significant difference was found 
between Models 2 and 7. 
Fifth, certain enterprises exhibited no managerial 
responses during a certain period. In the observations 
without managerial responses, we set the average 
degree of personalization to zero, which may have 
caused biases. Thus, we reestimated the model after 
removing these data. Model 8 shows that the results are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Model 2. 
Sixth, another concern would be the potential 
endogeneity of the volume and the degree of 
personalization of MR-P and MR-N. First, we used 
instrumental variables (IV) to address this issue. For 
MR-P volume, we developed two IVs. One is the 
average rank of the reviewers who left positive reviews 
(i.e., satisfied reviewer group) about the focal 
restaurant. Previous studies suggest that firms are more 
likely to respond to consumers with greater influence 
(e.g., higher rank) (Gunarathne et al., 2018). Thus, a 
higher average rank results in more review responses. 
However, reviewer rank is unlikely to correlate with 
the restaurant-specific shock (e.g., promotions) 
captured by the error term of the focal restaurant. 
Taking these two conditions together, we used the 
average rank of satisfied reviewers as an IV for MR-P 
volume. The other IV is the mean level of MR-P 
volume of restaurants from the same business district 
and cuisine type. Such an IV type is commonly 
adopted in the literature (e.g., Berry et al., 1995; Ghose 
& Han, 2014; Kleis et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015).  
Although the response strategy of a restaurant may 
correlate with the strategies of other restaurants in the 
same business district and cuisine type because of 
common shocks, the average MR-P volume of other 
restaurants is unlikely to correlate with the restaurant-
specific shock, which is captured by the error term of 
the focal restaurant. Based on the same rationale, we 
used the average rank of the dissatisfied reviewer 
group and the mean level of MR-N volume of 
restaurants from the same business district and cuisine 
type as the IVs for MR-N volume.  
For MR-P degree of personalization and MR-N degree 
of personalization, we constructed the same type of 
IVs as those for MR-P volume and MR-N volume. In 
particular, we used the average rank of the satisfied 
reviewer group as an IV for MR-P degree of 
personalization because managers are more likely to 
provide a specific response to consumers with higher 
levels of influence. The mean level of MR-P degree of 
personalization of restaurants from the same business 
district and cuisine type is another IV for MR-P degree 
of personalization. Similarly, we used the average rank 
of the dissatisfied reviewer group and the mean level 
of MR-N degree of personalization of restaurants from 
the same business district and cuisine type as IVs for 
MR-N degree of personalization. We further used a 
variation of the Chamberlain device to explicitly 
account for the potential correlation between the 
random effects and the covariates (Chamberlain, 1980; 
Yan & Tan, 2014). Specifically, we rewrote the 
restaurant-specific unobserved heterogeneity as 𝜇𝑖 =
𝜇𝑖
0 + 𝜇1?̅?𝑖 , where ?̅?𝑖  is the vector of the means of 
covariates that influence sales, and 𝜇1  denotes the 
vector of coefficients to be estimated. The results using 
IV and Chamberlain device approach, as shown in 
Model 9, are qualitatively similar to those shown in 
Model 2, indicating that the potential endogeniety 
issue did not result in significant differences in 
findings. 
Finally, responses that only thank the reviewer without 
any further statements, such as “Thank you for your 
review,” may be meaningless and have little effect on 
sales. Thus, we reestimated the model after deleting 
such responses. The results shown in Model 10 remain 
consistent. The proportion of such responses (only 
approximately 0.19%) was rather low in our data. 
6 Additional Analysis 
6.1 Experiment 
We conducted an experiment to verify the impacts of 
competitive intensity and market position on consumer 
trust in managerial responses, which we address in our 
hypotheses, recruiting a total of 659 undergraduate 
students. Participants were initially randomly assigned 
to one of the four contexts: weak competition, strong 
competition, low market position, and high market 
position. They were instructed to carefully read a 
scenario. To avoid potential biases associated with 
brands, the restaurant name was not revealed. Instead, 
participants were told that the reviews were posted for 
Restaurant A (Wei et al., 2013). Participants in the 
weak competition condition read: “Imagine that you 
are going to choose a restaurant for dinner and are 
browsing the reviews and responses of Restaurant A. 




Restaurant A faces weak competition.” In the 
conditions of strong competition, low market position, 
and high market position, the last sentence was 
replaced by “Restaurant A faces strong competition,” 
“Restaurant A is in an inferior position in the market, 
occupying only a small market share,” and “Restaurant 
A is in a leading position in the market, occupying a 
large market share,” respectively.  
After reading the scenario, participants were exposed 
to a set of positive or negative reviews and 
corresponding responses for Restaurant A. The 
reviews and responses were adapted from real reviews 
and responses posted on ABC.com to provide a natural 
setting for the experiment. The degree of 
personalization of responses (high vs. low) and the 
volume of responses (large vs. small) were 
manipulated experimentally to make causal 
inferences.3 After exposure to the stimuli, participants 
were asked to answer three groups of questions. The 
first group included several questions about 
manipulation checks. The second group consisted of a 
series of questions measuring their perceptions of 
ulterior motives (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; DeCarlo, 
2005; Kirmani & Zhu, 2007; Vonk, 1998), trust toward 
the responses (Crijns et al., 2017; Soh et al., 2009) and 
purchase intentions (Paharia et al., 2011). The third 
group of questions collected demographic information. 
The details of the experiment are provided in Appendix 
A. We ran ANOVA analyses, and provide the results 
in Appendix B. The manipulations of participants’ 
perceived valence of reviews, competitive intensity, 
market position, degree of personalization and volume 
of responses were proven effective (See Table B1). 
Under conditions of small and large MR-P volume, 
significantly greater suspicion of ulterior motives and 
lower trust in MR-P correlate with stronger 
competition and a lower market position (See Row 2 
and 3 of Table B2). As a result, large MR-P volume 
exhibited a significant positive impact on purchase 
intentions in the presence of weak competition and 
high market position, exerting no effect on purchase 
intentions in the presence of strong competition and 
low market position (See Column 2 of Table B3). 
These results indicate that competition and market 
position moderate the impact of MR-P volume by 
influencing suspicion of ulterior motives and consumer 
trust. In addition, the results show that enhancing the 
personalization of MR-P had an insignificant influence 
on purchase intentions regardless of competition level 
and market position (See Column 3 of Table B3), 
which is consistent with the main results in Model 2. 
 
3 The volume of responses (large vs. small) was determined 
based on the summary statistics of our data. The degree of 
personalization of responses (high vs. low) was based on the 
similarity score obtained from the text analysis. 
As expected, competition showed a weak influence on 
the suspicion of ulterior motives and consumer trust in 
all the four settings of MR-N (see the last four rows of 
Column 2 in Table B2). MR-N volume and degree of 
personalization had significant positive effects on 
purchase intentions in both strong and weak 
competition conditions (see Row 2 and 3 in the last two 
columns of Table B3). These results suggest that 
improving the volume and degree of personalization of 
MR-N is effective regardless of the level of 
competition because of the minimal influence of 
competition on consumer trust and suspicion of 
ulterior motives. Market position, likewise, had a weak 
effect on suspicion of ulterior motives and trust in MR-
N regardless of volume and degree of personalization 
(See the last four rows of Column 3 of Table B2). 
Consistent with H7 and H8, the influences of MR-N 
volume and degree of personalization on purchase 
intentions declined with increasing market position 
(2(1)volume = 3.00, p < 0.1;  2 (1)degree of personalization = 
3.02, p < 0.1). 
6.2 Further Exploration of Response 
Quality 
We examined the volume and the degree of 
personalization of MR-P and MR-N. Volume can be 
regarded as firms’ effort in terms of quantity, whereas 
degree of personalization can be regarded as firms’ 
effort in terms of quality. Response quality involves 
various aspects. In addition to the degree of 
personalization, we also considered another factor that 
may affect response quality. The factor is whether the 
response contains identity information, such as name 
and job title of the person who responded to the 
review. 4  Responses with identity information can 
make consumers aware of who they are 
communicating with and who is responsible for the 
response, which can be perceived as a conversational 
human voice (Crijns et al., 2017; Kwon & Sung, 2011). 
A conversational human voice is important for 
effective online communication and may influence 
response quality (van Noort & Willemsen, 2012). 
Thus, we added two variables, RepPIden and 
RepNIden, to our model. RepPIden denotes the ratio of 
the volume of MR-P with identity information to the 
total volume of MR-P. RepNIden indicates the ratio of 
the volume of MR-N with identity information to the 
total volume of MR-N.  
The results are provided in Appendix C. The effect of 
MR-N with identity information was not moderated by 
competitive intensity. As discussed above, investing 
4 This factor was determined after we communicated with the 
managers of ABC.com. Responses with identity information 
were identified based on a keyword list of job title and 
contact information. A name usually appears with a job title 
or contact information. 
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effort in MR-N is likely to be considered reasonable 
and useful by consumers. Increasing the proportion of 
MR-N that include identity information indicates 
firms’ efforts in communicating with consumers and 
addressing their complaints because the person leaving 
the response can be contacted. Thus, consumers will be 
less likely to suspect ulterior motives when observing 
MR-N with identity information, and MR-N with 
identity information would be expected to weaken the 
influence of competitive intensity on consumer trust. 
Increasing the proportion of MR-N with identity 
information should also remain effective when 
competition is intense, thus rendering the moderating 
effect of competitive intensity insignificant.  
Similarly, the impact of market position on consumer 
trust in MR-N with identity information should be 
small as well. Given the non-diagnosticity of the low 
market position, consumers require more information 
to make purchase decisions for firms with low market 
positions (Chen et al., 2011; Feldman & Lynch, 1988; 
Lee et al., 2017). MR-N with identity information 
should be useful when making decisions for such 
firms. Thus, increasing the proportion of MR-N with 
identity information exerts a larger influence on firms 
with lower market position. Increasing the proportion 
of MR-P with identity information showed no effect on 
sales because identity information is of little 
consequence when communicating with consumers 
who are already satisfied and not seeking a response. 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 Discussion of Findings 
In this study, we examined how competitive intensity 
and market position moderate the impact of managerial 
responses on sales. We considered various aspects of 
managerial responses: MR-P volume, MR-P degree of 
personalization, MR-N volume, and MR-N degree of 
personalization. We found that the moderating effects 
of competitive intensity and market position vary for 
different aspects of managerial responses. MR-P 
volume exerted a more evident impact on sales when 
competition was weaker and market position was 
higher. Furthermore, increasing the MR-N volume and 
degree of personalization remained effective 
regardless of competitive intensity. Finally, we found 
that the influences of MR-N volume and degree of 
personalization on sales decline with increasing market 
position.  
7.2 Theoretical Contributions 
This study contributes to extant research on the 
impacts of managerial responses. Prior literature 
documenting the impacts of managerial responses 
devotes more attention to characteristics of managerial 
responses, such as volume (Lee et al., 2017; Xie et al., 
2014; Xie et al., 2017), response speed (Xie et al., 
2017), and response strategy (Dens et al., 2015; Lee & 
Song, 2010; van Noort & Willemsen, 2012). However, 
managerial responses not only involve these 
characteristics but also the competitiveness of the 
environment and the market position of enterprises that 
provide such responses, and the impact of managerial 
responses may change according to competitive 
intensity and market position. Our findings 
demonstrate that competitive intensity and market 
position moderate the effects of managerial responses 
on sales, and thus deepen the understanding of the 
impact of managerial responses. 
Our study also contributes to current research on the 
moderating effects of competitive environment and 
market position. Previous studies have revealed that 
both factors play a moderating role in relationships 
between firm behaviors and performance (Chauvin & 
Hirschey, 1993; Kim & Joo, 2013; Liu & Yang, 2009; 
Melville et al., 2007; Xue et al., 2012). We further 
demonstrated that competitive intensity and market 
position influence the effectiveness of managerial 
responses, extending the literature on the moderating 
effects of competitive environment and market 
position into the field of managerial responses. 
From the perspective of consumer trust, we applied the 
insights of the PKM that are widely used in traditional 
marketing literature (e.g., advertising) to the context of 
managerial responses. The PKM and its related 
research show that persuasion attempts can induce 
consumer suspicion (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; 
Crijns et al., 2017; Friestad & Wright, 1994). In terms 
of the PKM, Crijns et al. (2017) demonstrate that 
managerial responses can activate consumer 
skepticism; however, they did not explore consumer 
trust in terms of managerial responses of businesses 
with different market positions and face different 
competitive environments. Based on the PKM and its 
related research, this study explains how competitive 
intensity and market position affect consumer trust in 
managerial responses. We also conducted an 
experiment to verify our theoretical explanations. 
Finally, we combine two theoretical perspectives to 
explain the moderating effects of market position. 
Based on the accessibility-diagnosticity model, Chen 
et al. (2011) revealed the effects of two pieces of 
information—high market position and low market 
position—on consumers’ purchase decisions. The 
diagnosticity of these two pieces of information can 
influence whether consumers demand other 
information, such as managerial responses, to make 
decisions. On the basis of the conclusions of Chen et 
al. (2011), our research explains the moderating role of 
market position from the perspectives of information 
diagnosticity and consumer trust. Our findings suggest 
that the moderating effects of market position in the 
relationships between different types of managerial 




responses and sales can be explained from different 
perspectives. Market position affects the impact of 
MR-P volume by influencing consumer trust. The 
effectiveness of MR-N volume and degree of 
personalization change with market position because 
high and low market positions feature different degrees 
of diagnosticity. 
7.3 Practical Implications 
Certain industries present clear regional differences 
(Drucker, 2011). In our research data, major 
differences were found in the industry concentration 
among business districts, thus also reflecting regional 
differences in terms of competition. Enterprises in 
different regions face different competitive 
environments and occupy different market positions. 
Our study highlights that the effectiveness of 
managerial responses is affected by competitive 
intensity and market position. Therefore, enterprises 
should adjust their response strategies on the basis of 
data on competition and market position to maximize 
profit. When competition is intense, firms should 
mainly monitor negative WOM and respond to 
comments in a personalized manner, given the 
negligible impact of MR-P volume. When competition 
is weak, firms could appropriately increase the volume 
of MR-P. Simultaneously, increasing MR-N should 
also be considered, given their significant influence on 
sales in an environment of any level of 
competitiveness. 
For enterprises with high market positions, MR-N 
volume and degree of personalization exhibit minimal 
effects on sales. Thus, such enterprises can reduce 
investments in these types of responses and transfer 
resources to other marketing tools, such as promotional 
activities. Enterprises with a low market position 
should focus on responding to negative WOM rather 
than positive WOM and enhance the personalization of 
MR-N to increase the positive impact of managerial 
responses. These enterprises must see through the 
“lens” of consumers to perfect the responding 
approaches that make responses acceptable to 
consumers. Finally, our findings indicate that it is not 
worthwhile for firms to compose personalized 
responses to positive WOM because MR-P 
personalization shows no effect on sales. 
7.4 Limitations and Research Directions 
This study offers valuable insights into managerial 
responses but our results could be extended in various 
ways. First, our data only covered two administrative 
districts in Beijing. Data from other administrative 
districts could be incorporated in the future to verify 
the conclusions of this research. Second, the sales data 
used in this study did not include offline sales, which 
should be obtained in future research to test the 
robustness of our results. Third, we considered public 
managerial responses but enterprises may privately 
send messages to consumers to solve problems. Private 
communications between enterprises and consumers 
are similar to traditional service recovery, which is also 
one-to-one and nonpublic. Previous service recovery 
literature has manifested the effectiveness of service 
recovery efforts (McCollough, 2000; Swanson & Hsu, 
2011), suggesting that private communications may 
play a similar role. Further comparison between public 
managerial responses and private communications is 
also worthy of an investigation. Fourth, this research 
only studied responses from firms but consumers may 
also publicly react to these responses. All public 
interactions between consumers and companies are 
capable of conveying further information. Hence, 
future research could collect this information to 
identify consumers’ perceptions and attitudes in 
greater detail. 
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Appendix A: Experiment Design (Example of the Weak Competition and 
Highly Personalized MR-P Condition) 
Imagine that you are going to choose a restaurant for dinner and are browsing the reviews and responses of restaurant 
A. Restaurant A faces weak competition. 
You observe the following responses to positive reviews by restaurant A. 
Positive review 1: Suitable for children. The food tasted good. 
Response 1: I’m really happy that your child can have a good dining experience! Welcome to our restaurant. We hope 
your child likes the dishes.5 
Positive review 2: The lamb chops and beef kebabs were delicious. 
Response 2: Thanks for coming to our restaurant and thank you for your comments. Our mutton and beef are from the 
best cuts. Thank you for your recognition and support. Looking forward to your next visit! 
Please rate how you felt while reading the scenario. 1 = completely disagree and 7 = completely agree. 
1. Restaurant A responds to positive reviews because restaurant A thinks responses result in increased sales.  
2. Restaurant A has an ulterior motive for responding to positive reviews. 
3. Restaurant A is slimy when responding to positive reviews. 
4. I don’t believe what restaurant A says in its responses. 
5. Information conveyed in the responses is truthful. 
6. Information conveyed in the responses is credible. 
7. Information conveyed in the responses is honest. 
8. I believe what restaurant A says in its responses. 
9. The responses are reliable source of information when making purchase decisions. 
10. I am skeptical about the truthfulness of the responses.  
11. How likely would you choose restaurant A for dinner? (1 = unlikely and 7 = very likely) 
12. You think the competition encountered by restaurant A is strong. (1 = completely disagree and 7 = completely 
agree) 
13. You find the reviews negative. (1 = completely disagree and 7 = completely agree) 
14. You think the responses are personalized. (1 = completely disagree and 7 = completely agree) 
 
 
5 The degree of personalization for Response 1 and Response 2 are 0.922 and 0.944, respectively.  




Appendix B: Results of the Experiment 







(strong vs. weak) 
Market position 
(high vs. low) 
Volume 
(large vs. small) 
Degree of 
personalization 
(high vs. low) 
Statistical 
test 
F(1, 657) = 582.85, 
p < 0.01 
F(1, 325) = 22.16,  
p < 0.01 
F(1, 330) = 90.61, 
p < 0.01 
F(1, 325) = 
166.50, p < 0.01 F(1, 330) = 106.59, 
p < 0.01 
Table B2. The Effects of Competitive Intensity and Market Position  
on Perceived Ulterior Motives and Trust 
Conditions Competitive intensity (strong vs. weak) Market position (high vs. low) 
Small MR-P volume 
F(1, 38)Motive = 3.18, p < 0.1; 
F(1, 38)Trust = 3.59, p < 0.1 
F(1, 36)Motive = 3.16, p < 0.1; 
F(1, 36)Trust = 3.16, p < 0.1 
Large MR-P volume 
F(1, 37)Motive = 3.31, p < 0.1; 
F(1, 37)Trust = 4.57, p < 0.05 
F(1, 39)Motive = 3.85, p < 0.1; 
F(1, 39)Trust = 4.06, p < 0.1 
Low MR-P degree of 
personalization 
F(1, 36)Motive = 4.09, p < 0.1; 
F(1, 36)Trust = 3.03, p < 0.1 
F(1, 41)Motive = 2.91, p < 0.1; 
F(1, 41)Trust = 3.55, p < 0.1 
High MR-P degree of 
personalization 
F(1, 41)Motive = 0.39, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 41)Trust = 0.10, p > 0.1 
F(1, 39)Motive = 0.14, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 39)Trust = 0.03, p > 0.1 
Small MR-N volume 
F(1, 44)Motive = 0.10, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 44)Trust = 0.07, p > 0.1 
F(1, 39)Motive = 0.04, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 39)Trust = 0.34, p > 0.1 
Large MR-N volume 
F(1, 39)Motive = 0.09, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 39)Trust = 0.10, p > 0.1 
F(1, 39)Motive = 2.02, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 39)Trust = 0.46, p > 0.1 
Low MR-N degree of 
personalization 
F(1, 38)Motive = 0.02, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 38)Trust = 0.11, p > 0.1 
F(1, 44)Motive = 0.68, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 44)Trust = 0.02, p > 0.1 
High MR-N degree of 
personalization 
F(1, 38)Motive = 0.74, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 38)Trust = 0.01, p > 0.1 
F(1, 39)Motive =0.12, p > 0.1; 
F(1, 39)Trust = 0.35, p > 0.1 
Table B3. The Effects of Volume and Degree of Personalization on Purchase Intention 
Conditions 
MR-P volume 
(large vs. small) 
MR-P degree of 
personalization 
(high vs. low) 
MR-N volume 
(large vs. small) 
MR-N degree of 
personalization 
(high vs. low) 
Strong 
competition 
F(1, 35) = 0.04, 
p > 0.1 
F(1, 35) = 0.21, 
p > 0.1 
F(1, 41) = 3.44, 
p < 0.1 
F(1, 40) = 4.21, 
p < 0.05 
Weak 
competition 
F(1, 38) = 2.98, 
p < 0.1 
F(1, 40) = 0.02, 
p > 0.1 
F(1, 40) = 3.82, 
p < 0.1 
F(1, 33) = 3.73, 
p < 0.1 
High market 
position 
F(1, 38) = 3.21, 
p < 0.1 
F(1, 40) = 0.28, 
p > 0.1 
F(1, 42) = 2.89, 
p < 0.1 
F(1, 40) = 3.16, 
p < 0.1 
Low market 
position 
F(1, 36) = 0.40, 
p > 0.1 
F(1, 38) = 0.41, 
p > 0.1 
F(1, 34) = 13.13, 
p < 0.01 
F(1, 41) = 11.52, 
p < 0.01 
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Appendix C: Results of Response Quality 
 
Table C1. Response Quality 

















Cr4 * RepPVol 0.074* 
(0.043)  
Cr4 * RepNVol 0.003 
(0.029)  
Cr4 * RepPPer -0.055 
(0.112)  
Cr4 * RepNPer 0.075 
(0.137)  
Cr4 * RepPIden -0.034 
(0.041) 
Cr4 * RepNIden -0.018 
(0.026) 
Mr * RepPVol 0.362*** 
(0.096)  
Mr * RepNVol -0.601* 
(0.318)  
Mr * RepPPer -0.040 
(0.272)  
Mr * RepNPer -1.468* 
(0.884)  
Mr * RepPIden 0.127 
(0.225) 
Mr * RepNIden -0.822*** 
(0.182) 
Note: Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
Control variables are not shown in the table. 




Appendix D: Correlations 
Table D1. Correlations 
Variable ln(Sales) RepPVol RepNVol RepPPer RepNPer Cr4 Mr Val Vol Var Shopnum Price Popularity Tenure Openhour 
ln(Sales) -               
RepPVol 0.162 -              
RepNVol 0.198 0.632 -             
RepPPer 0.154 0.260 0.475 -            
RepNPer 0.164 0.267 0.456 0.866 -           
Cr4 -0.014 0.004 0.029 0.015 0.016 -          
Mr 0.309 0.071 0.121 0.077 0.087 0.426 -         
Val 0.099 0.086 0.102 0.144 0.189 0.023 0.063 -        
Vol 0.339 0.197 0.194 0.121 0.140 -0.017 0.157 0.154 -       
Var 0.179 0.044 0.118 0.155 0.166 -0.034 0.040 -0.059 0.155 -      
Shopnum 0.098 0.051 0.090 0.152 0.171 -0.020 0.033 0.099 0.095 0.116 -     
Price 0.299 0.131 0.188 0.231 0.259 -0.014 0.133 0.183 0.320 0.251 0.220 -    
Popularity 0.338 0.193 0.264 0.264 0.294 -0.028 0.146 0.197 0.318 0.187 0.236 0.444 -   
Tenure 0.050 0.008 -0.002 -0.040 -0.053 -0.061 -0.016 -0.131 0.251 0.097 0.001 0.095 -0.058 -  
Openhour 0.102 0.007 -0.019 -0.107 -0.134 -0.036 0.022 -0.163 0.138 0.085 -0.107 -0.068 -0.063 0.253 - 
Impact of Managerial Responses on Product Sales  
 
570 
About the Authors 
Yinli Huang is a PhD student in the Department of Management Science and Engineering in the School of Economics 
and Management, Tsinghua University. Her research interests focus on the business value of information systems, 
online managerial response, online consumer behavior, and electronic commerce. 
Yue Jin is an assistant professor in the E-Business Department in the School of Information Technology and 
Management at the University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China. She received her PhD in 
management science and engineering from the School of Economics and Management at Tsinghua University. Her 
research interests include economics, social media and networks, mobile and electronic commerce, and online 
education. Her research has appeared in Electronic Commerce Research and Applications and Information Systems 
and e-Business Management. Yue Jin is the co-corresponding author of this research. 
Jinghua Huang is a full professor in the Research Center for Contemporary Management, Department of Management 
Science and Engineering, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University. She received her PhD from 
Tsinghua University in 2004. Her research interests include business value of IS/IT, social networking and electronic 
business. Professor Huang has published or will publish papers in the following journals: Information Systems 
Research, Information & Management, Communications of Association for Information Systems, Electronic 






















Copyright © 2021 by the Association for Information Systems. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part 
of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for 
profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and full citation on the first page. Copyright for 
components of this work owned by others than the Association for Information Systems must be honored. Abstracting 
with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior 
specific permission and/or fee. Request permission to publish from: AIS Administrative Office, P.O. Box 2712 Atlanta, 
GA, 30301-2712 Attn: Reprints, or via email from publications@aisnet.org. 
